10 ideas
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16236 | Maybe our persistence conditions concern bodies, rather than persons [Olson, by Hawley] |
6669 | For 'animalism', I exist before I became a person, and can continue after it, so I am not a person [Olson, by Lowe] |
23894 | The concept of character is at the centre of morality [Weil] |
23896 | We see our character as a restricting limit, but also as an unshakable support [Weil] |
23893 | We don't see character in a single moment, but only over a period of time [Weil] |
23895 | We modify our character by placing ourselves in situations, or by attending to what seems trivial [Weil] |