47 ideas
8060 | In the 17th-18th centuries morality offered a cure for egoism, through altruism [MacIntyre] |
8053 | Twentieth century social life is re-enacting eighteenth century philosophy [MacIntyre] |
8047 | Philosophy has been marginalised by its failure in the Enlightenment to replace religion [MacIntyre] |
8062 | Proof is a barren idea in philosophy, and the best philosophy never involves proof [MacIntyre] |
8472 | Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein] |
8476 | Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein] |
8480 | S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein] |
8474 | Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein] |
8465 | Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein] |
8452 | Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein] |
8475 | The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein] |
8454 | The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein] |
8473 | The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein] |
8458 | Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein] |
8052 | To find empiricism and science in the same culture is surprising, as they are really incompatible [MacIntyre] |
21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
8057 | Unpredictability doesn't entail inexplicability, and predictability doesn't entail explicability [MacIntyre] |
8054 | Social sciences discover no law-like generalisations, and tend to ignore counterexamples [MacIntyre] |
8457 | The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein] |
21050 | I can only make decisions if I see myself as part of a story [MacIntyre] |
8056 | AI can't predict innovation, or consequences, or external relations, or external events [MacIntyre] |
8477 | People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein] |
8471 | Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein] |
8484 | If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein] |
8059 | The good life for man is the life spent seeking the good life for man [MacIntyre] |
8034 | We still have the appearance and language of morality, but we no longer understand it [MacIntyre] |
8036 | Unlike expressions of personal preference, evaluative expressions do not depend on context [MacIntyre] |
8049 | Moral judgements now are anachronisms from a theistic age [MacIntyre] |
8045 | The failure of Enlightenment attempts to justify morality will explain our own culture [MacIntyre] |
8051 | Mention of 'intuition' in morality means something has gone wrong with the argument [MacIntyre] |
8048 | When 'man' is thought of individually, apart from all roles, it ceases to be a functional concept [MacIntyre] |
8035 | In trying to explain the type of approval involved, emotivists are either silent, or viciously circular [MacIntyre] |
8037 | The expression of feeling in a sentence is in its use, not in its meaning [MacIntyre] |
8040 | Emotivism cannot explain the logical terms in moral discourse ('therefore', 'if..then') [MacIntyre] |
8042 | Nowadays most people are emotivists, and it is embodied in our culture [MacIntyre] |
8058 | Maybe we can only understand rules if we first understand the virtues [MacIntyre] |
7097 | Virtue is secondary to a role-figure, defined within a culture [MacIntyre, by Statman] |
8043 | Characters are the masks worn by moral philosophies [MacIntyre] |
8061 | If morality just is emotion, there are no external criteria for judging emotions [MacIntyre] |
8038 | Since Moore thinks the right action produces the most good, he is a utilitarian [MacIntyre] |
8050 | There are no natural or human rights, and belief in them is nonsense [MacIntyre] |
8055 | If God is omniscient, he confronts no as yet unmade decisions, so decisions are impossible [MacIntyre] |