45 ideas
| 6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
| 6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
| 6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
| 6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
| 6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
| 7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
| 6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
| 6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
| 6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
| 6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
| 6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
| 6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
| 6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
| 6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
| 6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
| 1350 | Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid] |
| 21322 | We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid] |
| 21320 | Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid] |
| 1367 | Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid] |
| 6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
| 6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
| 6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
| 23643 | We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid] |
| 23644 | Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid] |
| 6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
| 21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
| 21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
| 21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
| 21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
| 21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
| 21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
| 1356 | A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid] |
| 1359 | Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid] |
| 21319 | I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid] |
| 21323 | The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid] |
| 21321 | Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid] |
| 21324 | If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid] |
| 21325 | Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid] |
| 21327 | If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid] |
| 1366 | If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid] |
| 1352 | Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid] |
| 6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
| 6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
| 6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
| 6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |