19 ideas
17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |
17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |
1457 | Morality requires a minimum commitment to the self [Rashdall] |
6674 | All moral judgements ultimately concern the value of ends [Rashdall] |
6673 | Ideal Utilitarianism is teleological but non-hedonistic; the aim is an ideal end, which includes pleasure [Rashdall] |
1458 | Conduct is only reasonable or unreasonable if the world is governed by reason [Rashdall] |
1459 | Absolute moral ideals can't exist in human minds or material things, so their acceptance implies a greater Mind [Rashdall, by PG] |