Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Against Coherence', 'An essentialist approach to Truth-making' and 'Logical Necessity: Some Issues'

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19 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18351 Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
18353 Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
18352 Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12184 Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
15083 The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
15084 In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
12180 Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
12181 Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
12183 It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
12192 The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
12182 We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12187 Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
12186 Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
21515 Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson]
21514 Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
21496 Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
21499 Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
21502 A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
21512 Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]