10 ideas
13827 | Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz] |
13826 | Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz] |
13074 | Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
7563 | The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley] |