9 ideas
| 13099 | Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz] |
| 9355 | One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt] |
| 5022 | We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz] |
| 21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
| 21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
| 21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
| 21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
| 21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
| 21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |