23 ideas
21918 | Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
13733 | Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9874 | Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
18252 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege] |
18271 | We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege] |
10623 | Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
9975 | Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege] |
18165 | My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege] |
21920 | No need for a priori categories, since sufficient reason shows the interrelations [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
21362 | Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
21361 | For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
21919 | Object for a subject and representation are the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
21917 | The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
21921 | Concepts are abstracted from perceptions [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
9190 | A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
13665 | Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro] |
21363 | Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer] |