Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Against Coherence', 'Mathematics without Foundations' and 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
13939 No possible evidence could decide the reality of numbers, so it is a pseudo-question [Carnap]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
9944 We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
9937 I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
9939 It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
9940 Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
9941 Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
13936 Questions about numbers are answered by analysis, and are analytic, and hence logically true [Carnap]
8748 Logical positivists incorporated geometry into logicism, saying axioms are just definitions [Carnap, by Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
8960 Internal questions about abstractions are trivial, and external ones deeply problematic [Carnap, by Szabó]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
13933 Existence questions are 'internal' (within a framework) or 'external' (concerning the whole framework) [Carnap]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
13934 To be 'real' is to be an element of a system, so we cannot ask reality questions about the system itself [Carnap]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
9943 You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
13938 A linguistic framework involves commitment to entities, so only commitment to the framework is in question [Carnap]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
13935 We only accept 'things' within a language with formation, testing and acceptance rules [Carnap]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
13932 Empiricists tend to reject abstract entities, and to feel sympathy with nominalism [Carnap]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
13937 New linguistic claims about entities are not true or false, but just expedient, fruitful or successful [Carnap]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
21515 Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson]
21514 Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
21496 Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
21499 Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
21502 A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
21512 Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
13940 All linguistic forms in science are merely judged by their efficiency as instruments [Carnap]