Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Against Coherence', 'Philippa Foot's Moral Thought' and 'Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism'

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15 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Inspiration
A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson]
Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Noncognitivism tries to avoid both naturalism and mysterious morality [Hacker-Wright]