Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Against Coherence', 'Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number' and 'Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation'

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23 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
23623 Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
23624 The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
23625 Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
23628 The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
23627 'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
23626 Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
23621 Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
23622 We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
21515 Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson]
21514 Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
21496 Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
21499 Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
21502 A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
21512 Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
5901 Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
5934 Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
3777 Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
3554 Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham]
3781 The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
3778 The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
20280 Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
3779 Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
3780 We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham]