Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Against Coherence', 'Neutral Relations' and 'The Individuation of Events'

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16 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson]
Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order [Fine,K]
The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K]
A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K]
Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased? [Fine,K]
Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road [Fine,K]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson]
Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]