17 ideas
| 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
| 16641 | Whiteness does not exist, but by it something can exist-as-white [Aquinas] |
| 22170 | Senses grasp external properties, but the understanding grasps the essential natures of things [Aquinas] |
| 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
| 22169 | Initial universal truths are present within us as potential, to be drawn out by reason [Aquinas] |
| 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
| 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
| 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
| 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
| 22168 | Minds take in a likeness of things, which activates an awaiting potential [Aquinas] |
| 21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
| 21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
| 21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
| 21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
| 21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
| 21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |