15 ideas
12149 | Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry] |
2602 | What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes] |
21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
2600 | The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes] |
2601 | Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes] |
12151 | If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry] |
18412 | Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry] |
12150 | Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry] |
15203 | Tense is essential for thought and action [Perry, by Le Poidevin] |
15204 | Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Perry, by Le Poidevin] |