Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Against Coherence', 'Leibniz' and 'Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic''

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15 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson]
Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Occasionalism contradicts the Eucharist, which needs genuine changes of substance [Arthur,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer]
Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer]
The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer]