22 ideas
| 3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
| 16252 | Metaphysics uses empty words, or just produces pseudo-statements [Carnap] |
| 3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
| 3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
| 3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
| 3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
| 3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
| 3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
| 3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
| 3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
| 3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
| 21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
| 21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
| 21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
| 21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
| 21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
| 21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
| 3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
| 3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
| 3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
| 3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
| 3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |