23 ideas
16951 | It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett] |
16985 | Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke] |
16952 | If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett] |
16953 | Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett] |
16960 | If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett] |
16958 | In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett] |
16982 | A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke] |
16981 | With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke] |
4942 | The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke] |
16984 | I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke] |
9385 | The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke] |
16957 | Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett] |
4943 | Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke] |
16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
16983 | Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke] |
21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
16956 | To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett] |
16954 | Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett] |