12 ideas
| 2572 | Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack] |
| 7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce] |
| 2570 | The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack] |
| 19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce] |
| 7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
| 21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
| 21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
| 21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
| 21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
| 21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
| 21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
| 14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce] |