19 ideas
14600 | Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J] |
14603 | 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J] |
14607 | T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J] |
14604 | If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J] |
14599 | Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J] |
14605 | Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J] |
14601 | Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J] |
14606 | Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J] |
21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
3286 | An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel] |
3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
4883 | Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel] |
3287 | We can't be objective about experience [Nagel] |
4989 | Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel] |