16 ideas
13010 | In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine] |
9002 | Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine] |
13681 | Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider] |
13829 | If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine] |
9003 | Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine] |
9004 | If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine] |
9006 | Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine] |
9001 | Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine] |
9005 | Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine] |
21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
22237 | The Greeks had a single word meaning both 'beautiful' and 'good' [Pormann] |