Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Varieties of Causation', 'Morality and the emotions' and 'Universal Prescriptivism'

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19 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa]
Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa]