14 ideas
| 14965 | Truth rests on Elimination ('A' is true → A) and Introduction (A → 'A' is true) [Gupta] |
| 14968 | A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate [Gupta] |
| 11970 | Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan] |
| 14964 | The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences [Gupta] |
| 14969 | Strengthened Liar: either this sentence is neither-true-nor-false, or it is not true [Gupta] |
| 11969 | Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan] |
| 8443 | Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa] |
| 11971 | The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan] |
| 11973 | Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan] |
| 11972 | Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan] |
| 11967 | Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan] |
| 8442 | What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa] |
| 8444 | Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa] |
| 8445 | The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa] |