20 ideas
| 19336 | Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz] |
| 8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
| 8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
| 7696 | Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette] |
| 19341 | There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz] |
| 19428 | Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz] |
| 5047 | The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz] |
| 8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
| 8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
| 8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
| 8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
| 8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
| 8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
| 7876 | Even if we identify pain with neural events, we can't explain why those neurons cause that feeling [Levine, by Papineau] |
| 7877 | Only phenomenal states have an explanatory gap; water is fully explained by H2O [Levine, by Papineau] |
| 7878 | Materialism won't explain phenomenal properties, because the latter aren't seen in causal roles [Papineau on Levine] |
| 19343 | We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz] |
| 19429 | The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz] |