Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Varieties of Causation', 'Introduction to Zermelo's 1930 paper' and 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness'

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22 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
4901 Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
17833 The first-order ZF axiomatisation is highly non-categorical [Hallett,M]
17834 Non-categoricity reveals a sort of incompleteness, with sets existing that the axioms don't reveal [Hallett,M]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
17837 Zermelo allows ur-elements, to enable the widespread application of set-theory [Hallett,M]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
17836 The General Continuum Hypothesis and its negation are both consistent with ZF [Hallett,M]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
8443 Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
4885 Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
4899 Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
4898 Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
4887 We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
4884 Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
4888 It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
4891 If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
4900 Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4892 If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
4889 Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
4896 The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
4897 A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
4890 A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
8442 What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
8445 The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa]
8444 Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa]