79 ideas
19917 | Without reason and human help, human life is misery [Spinoza] |
4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
8443 | Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa] |
4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
19922 | People are only free if they are guided entirely by reason [Spinoza] |
4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
19935 | Peoples are created by individuals, not by nature, and only distinguished by language and law [Spinoza] |
19914 | In nature everything has an absolute right to do anything it is capable of doing [Spinoza] |
19915 | Natural rights are determined by desire and power, not by reason [Spinoza] |
7487 | Society exists to extend human awareness [Spinoza, by Watson] |
19943 | The state aims to allow personal development, so its main purpose is freedom [Spinoza] |
19930 | Sovereignty must include the power to make people submit to it [Spinoza] |
19936 | Kings tend to fight wars for glory, rather than for peace and liberty [Spinoza] |
19937 | Monarchs are always proud, and can't back down [Spinoza] |
19940 | Deposing a monarch is dangerous, because the people are used to royal authority [Spinoza] |
19931 | Every state is more frightened of its own citizens than of external enemies [Spinoza] |
19920 | Democracy is a legitimate gathering of people who do whatever they can do [Spinoza] |
19933 | If religion is law, then piety is justice, impiety is crime, and non-believers must leave [Spinoza] |
19938 | Allowing religious ministers any control of the state is bad for both parties [Spinoza] |
19923 | Slavery is not just obedience, but acting only in the interests of the master [Spinoza] |
19939 | Government is oppressive if opinions can be crimes, because people can't give them up [Spinoza] |
19944 | Without liberty of thought there is no trust in the state, and corruption follows [Spinoza] |
19942 | Treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds [Spinoza] |
19924 | The freest state is a rational one, where people can submit themselves to reason [Spinoza] |
7827 | Spinoza wanted democracy based on individual rights, and is thus the first modern political philosopher [Stewart,M on Spinoza] |
19926 | The sovereignty has absolute power over citizens [Spinoza] |
19918 | Forming a society meant following reason, and giving up dangerous appetites and mutual harm [Spinoza] |
19919 | People only give up their rights, and keep promises, if they hope for some greater good [Spinoza] |
19921 | Once you have given up your rights, there is no going back [Spinoza] |
19925 | In democracy we don't abandon our rights, but transfer them to the majority of us [Spinoza] |
19928 | No one, in giving up their power and right, ceases to be a human being [Spinoza] |
19929 | Everyone who gives up their rights must fear the recipients of them [Spinoza] |
19932 | The early Hebrews, following Moses, gave up their rights to God alone [Spinoza] |
19916 | The order of nature does not prohibit anything, and allows whatever appetite produces [Spinoza] |
19927 | State and religious law can clash, so the state must make decisions about religion [Spinoza] |
4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
8442 | What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa] |
8445 | The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa] |
8444 | Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa] |
4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |
19934 | Hebrews were very hostile to other states, who had not given up their rights to God [Spinoza] |
4300 | The Bible has nothing in common with reasoning and philosophy [Spinoza] |