15 ideas
| 22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
| 15873 | Laws of nature are just records of regularities and correlations, with concepts to make recording them easier [Mach, by Harré] |
| 23634 | Accepting the existence of anything presupposes the notion of existence [Reid] |
| 19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
| 19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
| 23635 | Truths are self-evident to sensible persons who understand them clearly without prejudice [Reid] |
| 7631 | Sensation is not committed to any external object, but perception is [Reid] |
| 23637 | Primary qualities are the object of mathematics [Reid] |
| 23638 | Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them [Reid] |
| 23639 | It is unclear whether a toothache is in the mind or in the tooth, but the word has a single meaning [Reid] |
| 6492 | Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century [Reid, by Robinson,H] |
| 23641 | People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid] |
| 23642 | If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid] |
| 23640 | Only mature minds can distinguish the qualities of a body [Reid] |
| 19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |