Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology' and 'Davidson on himself'

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet]
Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl]
There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet]
Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl]
Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl]
'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl]
After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl]
Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Zermelo made 'set' and 'member' undefined axioms [Zermelo, by Chihara]
For Zermelo's set theory the empty set is zero and the successor of each number is its unit set [Zermelo, by Blackburn]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Only facts follow from facts [Husserl]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]