54 ideas
| 3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
| 3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
| 3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
| 3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
| 15924 | Predicative definitions are acceptable in mathematics if they distinguish objects, rather than creating them? [Zermelo, by Lavine] |
| 17608 | We take set theory as given, and retain everything valuable, while avoiding contradictions [Zermelo] |
| 17607 | Set theory investigates number, order and function, showing logical foundations for mathematics [Zermelo] |
| 10870 | ZFC: Existence, Extension, Specification, Pairing, Unions, Powers, Infinity, Choice [Zermelo, by Clegg] |
| 13012 | Zermelo published his axioms in 1908, to secure a controversial proof [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
| 17609 | Set theory can be reduced to a few definitions and seven independent axioms [Zermelo] |
| 13017 | Zermelo introduced Pairing in 1930, and it seems fairly obvious [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
| 13015 | Zermelo used Foundation to block paradox, but then decided that only Separation was needed [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
| 13020 | The Axiom of Separation requires set generation up to one step back from contradiction [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
| 13486 | Not every predicate has an extension, but Separation picks the members that satisfy a predicate [Zermelo, by Hart,WD] |
| 3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
| 3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
| 13487 | In ZF, the Burali-Forti Paradox proves that there is no set of all ordinals [Zermelo, by Hart,WD] |
| 18178 | For Zermelo the successor of n is {n} (rather than n U {n}) [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
| 13027 | Zermelo believed, and Von Neumann seemed to confirm, that numbers are sets [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
| 9627 | Different versions of set theory result in different underlying structures for numbers [Zermelo, by Brown,JR] |
| 3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
| 3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
| 3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
| 3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
| 3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
| 3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
| 3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
| 3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
| 3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
| 3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
| 3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
| 3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
| 3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
| 3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
| 3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
| 8353 | Freedom involves acting according to an idea [Anscombe] |
| 3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
| 3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
| 3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
| 8352 | To believe in determinism, one must believe in a system which determines events [Anscombe] |
| 3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
| 3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
| 3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
| 3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
| 3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
| 3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
| 3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
| 3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
| 8351 | With diseases we easily trace a cause from an effect, but we cannot predict effects [Anscombe] |
| 4777 | The word 'cause' is an abstraction from a group of causal terms in a language (scrape, push..) [Anscombe] |
| 10363 | Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata [Anscombe, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8350 | Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions [Anscombe] |