23 ideas
18680 | To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi] |
1757 | The Electra: she knows this man, but not that he is her brother [Eucleides, by Diog. Laertius] |
18684 | Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi] |
8122 | True works of art transmit completely new feelings [Tolstoy] |
8121 | Art is when one man uses external signs to hand on his feelings to another man [Tolstoy] |
8124 | The highest feelings of mankind can only be transmitted by art [Tolstoy] |
8123 | The purpose of art is to help mankind to evolve better, more socially beneficial feelings [Tolstoy] |
22710 | People estimate art according to their moral values [Tolstoy] |
8125 | The upper classes put beauty first, and thus freed themselves from morality [Tolstoy] |
8064 | We separate the concept of beauty from goodness, unlike the ancients [Tolstoy] |
18666 | Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi] |
18667 | The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi] |
18685 | Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi] |
18679 | Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi] |
18682 | A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi] |
18683 | Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi] |
18686 | The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi] |
18672 | Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi] |
18677 | A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi] |
18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |
18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |
3028 | The chief good is unity, sometimes seen as prudence, or God, or intellect [Eucleides] |