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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'A Defense of Presentism' and 'Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)]
Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
The Electra: she knows this man, but not that he is her brother [Eucleides, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The chief good is unity, sometimes seen as prudence, or God, or intellect [Eucleides]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian]
Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian]
Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian]
Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian]
Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian]
Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian]
Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian]
People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian]