13 ideas
| 7557 | To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell] |
| 10059 | In mathematic we are ignorant of both subject-matter and truth [Russell] |
| 7556 | A collection is infinite if you can remove some terms without diminishing its number [Russell] |
| 7554 | Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell] |
| 8845 | An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor] |
| 8842 | The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor] |
| 8843 | Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor] |
| 8844 | Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor] |
| 8846 | Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor] |
| 8847 | Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor] |
| 20575 | Socialist economics needs a very strong central power, virtually leading to slavery [Hayek, by Oksala] |
| 22599 | Hayek was a liberal, but mainly concerned with market freedom [Hayek, by Dunt] |
| 22600 | Impeding the market is likely to lead to extensive state control [Hayek] |