46 ideas
| 4767 | Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos] |
| 5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
| 4810 | Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos] |
| 4768 | The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos] |
| 2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
| 16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
| 4807 | A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos] |
| 4808 | If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos] |
| 4811 | Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos] |
| 4812 | Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos] |
| 4802 | Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos] |
| 4804 | The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos] |
| 4805 | If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos] |
| 4395 | There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos] |
| 4806 | An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos] |
| 4404 | Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos] |
| 4803 | An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos] |
| 2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
| 5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
| 5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
| 4769 | It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos] |
| 5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
| 5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
| 5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
| 5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
| 5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
| 5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
| 2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
| 4770 | Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos] |
| 5655 | Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton] |
| 4403 | We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos] |
| 4399 | Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos] |
| 4400 | Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos] |
| 4789 | Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos] |
| 4790 | If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos] |
| 4402 | Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos] |
| 4774 | Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos] |
| 4793 | "All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos] |
| 4397 | Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos] |
| 4792 | A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos] |
| 4801 | The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos] |
| 4401 | It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos] |
| 4796 | Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos] |
| 4799 | Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos] |
| 4780 | In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos] |
| 4791 | Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos] |