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All the ideas for 'Ethical Studies', 'fragments/reports' and 'Logic for Philosophy'

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69 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
'Theorems' are formulas provable from no premises at all [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Truth tables assume truth functionality, and are just pictures of truth functions [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
Intuitively, deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive, but to be serial [Sider]
In D we add that 'what is necessary is possible'; then tautologies are possible, and contradictions not necessary [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
System B introduces iterated modalities [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 is the strongest system, since it has the most valid formulas, because it is easy to be S5-valid [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 5. Epistemic Logic
Epistemic accessibility is reflexive, and allows positive and negative introspection (KK and K¬K) [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
We can treat modal worlds as different times [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
Converse Barcan Formula: □∀αφ→∀α□φ [Sider]
The Barcan Formula ∀x□Fx→□∀xFx may be a defect in modal logic [Sider]
System B is needed to prove the Barcan Formula [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
You can employ intuitionist logic without intuitionism about mathematics [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
The most popular account of logical consequence is the semantic or model-theoretic one [Sider]
Maybe logical consequence is more a matter of provability than of truth-preservation [Sider]
Maybe logical consequence is impossibility of the premises being true and the consequent false [Sider]
Maybe logical consequence is a primitive notion [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
A 'theorem' is an axiom, or the last line of a legitimate proof [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
When a variable is 'free' of the quantifier, the result seems incapable of truth or falsity [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
A 'total' function must always produce an output for a given domain [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
λ can treat 'is cold and hungry' as a single predicate [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
Good axioms should be indisputable logical truths [Sider]
No assumptions in axiomatic proofs, so no conditional proof or reductio [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 3. Proof from Assumptions
Proof by induction 'on the length of the formula' deconstructs a formula into its accepted atoms [Sider]
Induction has a 'base case', then an 'inductive hypothesis', and then the 'inductive step' [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Natural deduction helpfully allows reasoning with assumptions [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 6. Sequent Calculi
We can build proofs just from conclusions, rather than from plain formulae [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Valuations in PC assign truth values to formulas relative to variable assignments [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
The semantical notion of a logical truth is validity, being true in all interpretations [Sider]
It is hard to say which are the logical truths in modal logic, especially for iterated modal operators [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
In model theory, first define truth, then validity as truth in all models, and consequence as truth-preservation [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
In a complete logic you can avoid axiomatic proofs, by using models to show consequences [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Compactness surprisingly says that no contradictions can emerge when the set goes infinite [Sider]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Things get smaller without end [Anaxagoras]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
A single second-order sentence validates all of arithmetic - but this can't be proved axiomatically [Sider]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Nothing is created or destroyed; there is only mixing and separation [Anaxagoras]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Anaxagoras's concept of supreme Mind has a simple First and a multiple One [Anaxagoras, by Plotinus]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / a. Fundamental reality
Basic is the potentially perceptible, then comes the contrary qualities, and finally the 'elements' [Anaxagoras]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation [Sider]
Supervaluational logic is classical, except when it adds the 'Definitely' operator [Sider]
A 'supervaluation' assigns further Ts and Fs, if they have been assigned in every precisification [Sider]
We can 'sharpen' vague terms, and then define truth as true-on-all-sharpenings [Sider]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
A relation is a feature of multiple objects taken together [Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist [Sider]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible [Sider]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical truths must be necessary if anything is [Sider]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
'If B hadn't shot L someone else would have' if false; 'If B didn't shoot L, someone else did' is true [Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual [Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Snow is not white, and doesn't even appear white, because it is made of black water [Anaxagoras, by Cicero]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The senses are too feeble to determine the truth [Anaxagoras]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
We reveal unreliability in the senses when we cannot discriminate a slow change of colour [Anaxagoras, by Sext.Empiricus]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
Nous is unlimited, self-ruling and pure; it is the finest thing, with great discernment and strength [Anaxagoras]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Mind is self-ruling, pure, ordering and ubiquitous [Anaxagoras, by Plato]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Anaxagoras says mind remains pure, and so is not affected by what it changes [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Anaxagoras said a person would choose to be born to contemplate the ordered heavens [Anaxagoras]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
For Anaxagoras the Good Mind has no opposite, and causes all movement, for a higher reason [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Mind creates the world from a mixture of pure substances [Anaxagoras, by ]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
Anaxagoras said that the number of principles was infinite [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle]
The ultimate constituents of reality are the homoeomeries [Anaxagoras, by Vlastos]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Anaxagoreans regard the homoeomeries as elements, which compose earth, air, fire and water [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Anaxagoras says mind produces order and causes everything [Anaxagoras, by Plato]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 1. Biology
Germs contain microscopic organs, which become visible as they grow [Anaxagoras]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
When things were unified, Mind set them in order [Anaxagoras]
Anaxagoras was the first to say that the universe is directed by an intelligence [Anaxagoras, by Cicero]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
Past, present and future, and the movements of the heavens, were arranged by Mind [Anaxagoras]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Anaxagoras was charged with impiety for calling the sun a lump of stone [Anaxagoras, by Plutarch]
Anaxagoras was the first recorded atheist [Anaxagoras, by Watson]