19 ideas
21704 | 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B] |
21705 | Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B] |
21727 | Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B] |
21719 | Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B] |
21723 | The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B] |
21721 | Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B] |
21703 | Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B] |
21714 | The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B] |
21713 | Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B] |
21715 | For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B] |
21729 | Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B] |
13804 | A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G] |
13805 | Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G] |
13808 | A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G] |
13806 | Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G] |
13807 | A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G] |
13809 | One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G] |
13810 | The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G] |
5655 | Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton] |