15 ideas
| 18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
| 18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
| 18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
| 18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
| 18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
| 16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
| 18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
| 18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
| 18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
| 16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
| 16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
| 18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |
| 16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
| 5655 | Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton] |
| 4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |