Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ethical Studies', 'Identity and Existence in Logic' and 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
19306 It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
19304 The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
19307 If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
19309 Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
19303 Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
18767 Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
18763 Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
18771 Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
18769 Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
18770 We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
18766 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA]
18768 We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
18765 Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
18764 The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
19305 The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman]
19310 High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
19308 We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
19311 In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
19312 Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
5655 Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton]