Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Appearance and Reality', 'Brainchildren' and 'Armstrong on combinatorial possibility'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
5182 Claims about 'the Absolute' are not even verifiable in principle [Ayer on Bradley]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
6864 Metaphysics is finding bad reasons for instinctive beliefs [Bradley]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
15545 Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
15546 Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
15548 Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
14399 Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
10999 Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
15543 How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
6422 Internal relations are said to be intrinsic properties of two terms, and of the whole they compose [Bradley, by Russell]
7966 Relations must be linked to their qualities, but that implies an infinite regress of relations [Bradley]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
2526 Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
6404 British Idealists said reality is a single Mind which experiences itself [Bradley, by Grayling]
22299 Bradley's objective idealism accepts reality (the Absolute), but says we can't fully describe it [Bradley, by Potter]
21343 Qualities and relations are mere appearance; the Absolute is a single undifferentiated substance [Bradley, by Heil]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
2523 That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
2528 Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
2525 Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2527 Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2530 Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
2524 A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
2529 Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
6406 Reality is one, because plurality implies relations, and they assert a superior unity [Bradley]