10 ideas
9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20739 | Levinas took 'first philosophy' to begin with seeing the vulnerable faces of others [Levinas, by Aho] |
9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
5655 | Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton] |
20445 | Levinas says Marxism is the replacement of individualist ethics, by solidarity and sociality [Levinas, by Critchley] |