Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Appearance and Reality', 'Discourse on the Origin of Inequality' and 'Beginning Logic'

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104 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Claims about 'the Absolute' are not even verifiable in principle [Ayer on Bradley]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Metaphysics is finding bad reasons for instinctive beliefs [Bradley]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Reason leads to prudent selfishness, which overrules natural compassion [Rousseau]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
'Contradictory' propositions always differ in truth-value [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
That proposition that both P and Q is their 'conjunction', written P∧Q [Lemmon]
The sign |- may be read as 'therefore' [Lemmon]
If A and B are 'interderivable' from one another we may write A -||- B [Lemmon]
We write the conditional 'if P (antecedent) then Q (consequent)' as P→Q [Lemmon]
We write the 'negation' of P (not-P) as ¬ [Lemmon]
That proposition that either P or Q is their 'disjunction', written P∨Q [Lemmon]
We write 'P if and only if Q' as P↔Q; it is also P iff Q, or (P→Q)∧(Q→P) [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
A 'well-formed formula' follows the rules for variables, ¬, →, ∧, ∨, and ↔ [Lemmon]
A 'substitution-instance' is a wff formed by consistent replacing variables with wffs [Lemmon]
A wff is 'inconsistent' if all assignments to variables result in the value F [Lemmon]
Two propositions are 'equivalent' if they mirror one another's truth-value [Lemmon]
The 'scope' of a connective is the connective, the linked formulae, and the brackets [Lemmon]
A 'theorem' is the conclusion of a provable sequent with zero assumptions [Lemmon]
A 'implies' B if B is true whenever A is true (so that A→B is tautologous) [Lemmon]
'Subcontrary' propositions are never both false, so that A∨B is a tautology [Lemmon]
'Contrary' propositions are never both true, so that ¬(A∧B) is a tautology [Lemmon]
A wff is a 'tautology' if all assignments to variables result in the value T [Lemmon]
A wff is 'contingent' if produces at least one T and at least one F [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
DN: Given A, we may derive ¬¬A [Lemmon]
∧I: Given A and B, we may derive A∧B [Lemmon]
MPP: Given A and A→B, we may derive B [Lemmon]
∧E: Given A∧B, we may derive either A or B separately [Lemmon]
∨E: Derive C from A∨B, if C can be derived both from A and from B [Lemmon]
MTT: Given ¬B and A→B, we derive ¬A [Lemmon]
A: we may assume any proposition at any stage [Lemmon]
∨I: Given either A or B separately, we may derive A∨B [Lemmon]
RAA: If assuming A will prove B∧¬B, then derive ¬A [Lemmon]
CP: Given a proof of B from A as assumption, we may derive A→B [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
'Modus ponendo tollens' (MPT) says P, ¬(P ∧ Q) |- ¬Q [Lemmon]
We can change conjunctions into negated conditionals with P→Q -||- ¬(P → ¬Q) [Lemmon]
The Distributive Laws can rearrange a pair of conjunctions or disjunctions [Lemmon]
De Morgan's Laws make negated conjunctions/disjunctions into non-negated disjunctions/conjunctions [Lemmon]
We can change conditionals into disjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬P ∨ Q [Lemmon]
We can change conditionals into negated conjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬(P ∧ ¬Q) [Lemmon]
'Modus tollendo ponens' (MTP) says ¬P, P ∨ Q |- Q [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Truth-tables are good for showing invalidity [Lemmon]
A truth-table test is entirely mechanical, but this won't work for more complex logic [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 4. Soundness of PL
If any of the nine rules of propositional logic are applied to tautologies, the result is a tautology [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 5. Completeness of PL
Propositional logic is complete, since all of its tautologous sequents are derivable [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / a. Symbols of PC
Write '(∀x)(...)' to mean 'take any x: then...', and '(∃x)(...)' to mean 'there is an x such that....' [Lemmon]
'Gm' says m has property G, and 'Pmn' says m has relation P to n [Lemmon]
The 'symbols' are bracket, connective, term, variable, predicate letter, reverse-E [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / b. Terminology of PC
Our notation uses 'predicate-letters' (for 'properties'), 'variables', 'proper names', 'connectives' and 'quantifiers' [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / c. Derivations rules of PC
Universal Elimination (UE) lets us infer that an object has F, from all things having F [Lemmon]
Predicate logic uses propositional connectives and variables, plus new introduction and elimination rules [Lemmon]
Universal elimination if you start with the universal, introduction if you want to end with it [Lemmon]
With finite named objects, we can generalise with &-Intro, but otherwise we need ∀-Intro [Lemmon]
UE all-to-one; UI one-to-all; EI arbitrary-to-one; EE proof-to-one [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / d. Universal quantifier ∀
If there is a finite domain and all objects have names, complex conjunctions can replace universal quantifiers [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
'Some Frenchmen are generous' is rendered by (∃x)(Fx→Gx), and not with the conditional → [Lemmon]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
The paradoxes of material implication are P |- Q → P, and ¬P |- P → Q [Lemmon]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Internal relations are said to be intrinsic properties of two terms, and of the whole they compose [Bradley, by Russell]
Relations must be linked to their qualities, but that implies an infinite regress of relations [Bradley]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
No one would bother to reason, and try to know things, without a desire for enjoyment [Rousseau]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
British Idealists said reality is a single Mind which experiences itself [Bradley, by Grayling]
Bradley's objective idealism accepts reality (the Absolute), but says we can't fully describe it [Bradley, by Potter]
Qualities and relations are mere appearance; the Absolute is a single undifferentiated substance [Bradley, by Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
General ideas are purely intellectual; imagining them is immediately particular [Rousseau]
Only words can introduce general ideas into the mind [Rousseau]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
Language may aid thinking, but powerful thought was needed to produce language [Rousseau]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Without love, what use is beauty? [Rousseau]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Rational morality is OK for brainy people, but ordinary life can't rely on that [Rousseau]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
If we should not mistreat humans, it is mainly because of sentience, not rationality [Rousseau]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The better Golden Rule is 'do good for yourself without harming others' [Rousseau]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
The fact that we weep (e.g. in theatres) shows that we are naturally compassionate [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Humans are less distinguished from other animals by understanding, than by being free agents [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Most human ills are self-inflicted; the simple, solitary, regular natural life is good [Rousseau]
Is language a pre-requisite for society, or might it emerge afterwards? [Rousseau]
I doubt whether a savage person ever complains of life, or considers suicide [Rousseau]
Savages avoid evil because they are calm, and never think of it (not because they know goodness) [Rousseau]
Primitive man was very gentle [Rousseau]
Savage men quietly pursue desires, without the havoc of modern frenzied imagination [Rousseau]
Leisure led to envy, inequality, vice and revenge, which we now see in savages [Rousseau]
Our two starting principles are concern for self-interest, and compassion for others [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
A savage can steal fruit or a home, but there is no means of achieving obedience [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / b. Natural equality
In a state of nature people are much more equal; it is society which increases inequalities [Rousseau]
It is against nature for children to rule old men, fools to rule the wise, and the rich to hog resources [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
People accept the right to be commanded, because they themselves wish to command [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
We seem to have made individual progress since savagery, but actually the species has decayed [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Revolutionaries usually confuse liberty with total freedom, and end up with heavier chains [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
Plebiscites are bad, because they exclude the leaders from crucial decisions [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
In a direct democracy, only the leaders should be able to propose new laws [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
People must be made dependent before they can be enslaved [Rousseau]
Enslaved peoples often boast of their condition, calling it a state of 'peace' [Rousseau]
If the child of a slave woman is born a slave, then a man is not born a man [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Like rich food, liberty can ruin people who are too weak to cope with it [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Three stages of the state produce inequalities of wealth, power, and enslavement [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
The pleasure of wealth and power is largely seeing others deprived of them [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Persuading other people that some land was 'owned' was the beginning of society [Rousseau]
What else could property arise from, but the labour people add to it? [Rousseau]
Land cultivation led to a general right of ownership, administered justly [Rousseau]
If we have a natural right to property, what exactly does 'belonging to' mean? [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Writers just propose natural law as the likely useful agreements among people [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Primitive people simply redressed the evil caused by violence, without thought of punishing [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
A state of war remains after a conquest, if the losers don't accept the winners [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Both men and animals are sentient, which should give the latter the right not to be mistreated [Rousseau]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
Reality is one, because plurality implies relations, and they assert a superior unity [Bradley]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
Men started with too few particular names, but later had too few natural kind names [Rousseau]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Small uninterrupted causes can have big effects [Rousseau]