Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Appearance and Reality', 'Philebus' and 'A priori/A posteriori'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


35 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Claims about 'the Absolute' are not even verifiable in principle [Ayer on Bradley]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Metaphysics is finding bad reasons for instinctive beliefs [Bradley]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato]
If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Internal relations are said to be intrinsic properties of two terms, and of the whole they compose [Bradley, by Russell]
Relations must be linked to their qualities, but that implies an infinite regress of relations [Bradley]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
British Idealists said reality is a single Mind which experiences itself [Bradley, by Grayling]
Bradley's objective idealism accepts reality (the Absolute), but says we can't fully describe it [Bradley, by Potter]
Qualities and relations are mere appearance; the Absolute is a single undifferentiated substance [Bradley, by Heil]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification [Casullo]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato]
Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato]
It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato]
Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato]
Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato]
The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato]
A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato]
Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
Reality is one, because plurality implies relations, and they assert a superior unity [Bradley]