20 ideas
14187 | If logic is topic-neutral that means it delves into all subjects, rather than having a pure subject matter [Read] |
14188 | Not all arguments are valid because of form; validity is just true premises and false conclusion being impossible [Read] |
14182 | If the logic of 'taller of' rests just on meaning, then logic may be the study of merely formal consequence [Read] |
14183 | Maybe arguments are only valid when suppressed premises are all stated - but why? [Read] |
14184 | In modus ponens the 'if-then' premise contributes nothing if the conclusion follows anyway [Read] |
14186 | Logical connectives contain no information, but just record combination relations between facts [Read] |
14508 | A 'thisness' is a thing's property of being identical with itself (not the possession of self-identity) [Adams,RM] |
14511 | There are cases where mere qualities would not ensure an intrinsic identity [Adams,RM] |
12031 | Essences are taken to be qualitative properties [Adams,RM] |
12034 | If the universe was cyclical, totally indiscernible events might occur from time to time [Adams,RM] |
14510 | Two events might be indiscernible yet distinct, if there was a universe cyclical in time [Adams,RM] |
16455 | Black's two globes might be one globe in highly curved space [Adams,RM] |
14185 | Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read] |
14507 | Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well? [Adams,RM] |
11964 | Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar] |
16451 | Adams says anti-haecceitism reduces all thisness to suchness [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker] |
11901 | Haecceitism may or may not involve some logical connection to essence [Adams,RM, by Mackie,P] |
14512 | Moderate Haecceitism says transworld identities are primitive, but connected to qualities [Adams,RM] |
12032 | Direct reference is by proper names, or indexicals, or referential uses of descriptions [Adams,RM] |
5655 | Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton] |