17 ideas
| 5182 | Claims about 'the Absolute' are not even verifiable in principle [Ayer on Bradley] |
| 6864 | Metaphysics is finding bad reasons for instinctive beliefs [Bradley] |
| 9184 | We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson] |
| 17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
| 10999 | Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read] |
| 9183 | Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson] |
| 6422 | Internal relations are said to be intrinsic properties of two terms, and of the whole they compose [Bradley, by Russell] |
| 7966 | Relations must be linked to their qualities, but that implies an infinite regress of relations [Bradley] |
| 11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
| 6404 | British Idealists said reality is a single Mind which experiences itself [Bradley, by Grayling] |
| 22299 | Bradley's objective idealism accepts reality (the Absolute), but says we can't fully describe it [Bradley, by Potter] |
| 21343 | Qualities and relations are mere appearance; the Absolute is a single undifferentiated substance [Bradley, by Heil] |
| 17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
| 17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
| 6406 | Reality is one, because plurality implies relations, and they assert a superior unity [Bradley] |
| 17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
| 11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |