16 ideas
| 9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 7096 | We may still admire a person's character even if the traits are involuntary [Statman] |
| 7098 | There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman] |
| 7099 | With a broad concept of flourishing, it might be possible without the virtues [Statman] |
| 5655 | Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton] |
| 7100 | Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman] |
| 7102 | Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman] |
| 7095 | Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman] |
| 7094 | Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman] |
| 7104 | The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman] |
| 7093 | Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman] |
| 7103 | Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman] |