119 ideas
| 18559 | Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact [Machery] |
| 3426 | If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim] |
| 3431 | Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim] |
| 3437 | 'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim] |
| 18564 | Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals? [Machery] |
| 18604 | Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different? [Machery] |
| 18573 | For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts [Machery] |
| 18602 | A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws [Machery] |
| 18565 | There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip [Machery] |
| 3430 | Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim] |
| 3432 | Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim] |
| 3434 | Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim] |
| 3436 | Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim] |
| 18570 | There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts [Machery] |
| 3406 | Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG] |
| 18616 | If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery] |
| 18614 | Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery] |
| 18615 | Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery] |
| 18609 | Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another [Machery] |
| 18610 | 'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them [Machery] |
| 3368 | Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim] |
| 3392 | Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim] |
| 3396 | Experiment requires mental causation [Kim] |
| 3397 | Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim] |
| 3367 | Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim] |
| 3365 | Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim] |
| 3360 | Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim] |
| 3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
| 3389 | Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim] |
| 3391 | Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG] |
| 3422 | Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim] |
| 3412 | How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim] |
| 3363 | We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim] |
| 3409 | Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim] |
| 3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
| 3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
| 3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
| 3359 | Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim] |
| 3369 | Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim] |
| 3428 | Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim] |
| 3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
| 3370 | What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim] |
| 3371 | Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim] |
| 3372 | Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim] |
| 3373 | Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim] |
| 3379 | Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim] |
| 3388 | Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim] |
| 3384 | The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim] |
| 3393 | How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim] |
| 3439 | Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim] |
| 3427 | Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim] |
| 3376 | We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim] |
| 3424 | Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim] |
| 3362 | Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim] |
| 3413 | Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim] |
| 3374 | Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim] |
| 3433 | The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim] |
| 3377 | Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim] |
| 18562 | Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes [Machery] |
| 3438 | Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim] |
| 3440 | Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim] |
| 3375 | If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim] |
| 18561 | We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery] |
| 3411 | How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim] |
| 3386 | Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim] |
| 3394 | Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim] |
| 3387 | A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim] |
| 3410 | Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim] |
| 3382 | A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim] |
| 3383 | The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim] |
| 3408 | Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim] |
| 3420 | Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim] |
| 3416 | Content may match several things in the environment [Kim] |
| 3418 | 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim] |
| 3421 | Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim] |
| 3419 | Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim] |
| 3417 | Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim] |
| 18574 | Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery] |
| 18588 | Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery] |
| 18611 | We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery] |
| 18567 | In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery] |
| 18569 | In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery] |
| 18563 | By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery] |
| 18558 | Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery] |
| 18557 | Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery] |
| 18560 | Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery] |
| 18592 | The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery] |
| 18566 | Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery] |
| 18584 | One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery] |
| 18585 | Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery] |
| 18578 | Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery] |
| 18575 | The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery] |
| 18591 | Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery] |
| 18583 | Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery] |
| 18590 | Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery] |
| 18594 | Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery] |
| 18593 | The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery] |
| 18595 | Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery] |
| 18596 | Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery] |
| 18603 | Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery] |
| 18605 | It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery] |
| 18606 | The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery] |
| 18597 | Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery] |
| 18598 | Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery] |
| 18599 | In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery] |
| 18600 | Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery] |
| 18601 | Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery] |
| 18607 | Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery] |
| 18608 | If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery] |
| 18587 | The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery] |
| 18577 | The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery] |
| 18589 | For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery] |
| 18612 | Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery] |
| 3403 | We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim] |
| 3402 | If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim] |
| 18613 | Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry [Machery] |
| 3401 | A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim] |
| 3407 | Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim] |
| 1451 | Design is seen in the way ideas match the world, in the mechanisms of evolution, and in values [Tennant,FR, by PG] |