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All the ideas for 'Alfred Tarski: life and logic', 'The Concept of a Person' and 'Reference and Definite Descriptions'

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27 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
10147 The Axiom of Choice is consistent with the other axioms of set theory [Feferman/Feferman]
10148 Axiom of Choice: a set exists which chooses just one element each of any set of sets [Feferman/Feferman]
10149 Platonist will accept the Axiom of Choice, but others want criteria of selection or definition [Feferman/Feferman]
10150 The Trichotomy Principle is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice [Feferman/Feferman]
10146 Cantor's theories needed the Axiom of Choice, but it has led to great controversy [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
7760 Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
5811 A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan]
5812 Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan]
5814 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10158 A structure is a 'model' when the axioms are true. So which of the structures are models? [Feferman/Feferman]
10162 Tarski and Vaught established the equivalence relations between first-order structures [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
10159 Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, and Gödel's completeness of first-order logic, the earliest model theory [Feferman/Feferman]
10160 Löwenheim-Skolem says if the sentences are countable, so is the model [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
10161 If a sentence holds in every model of a theory, then it is logically derivable from the theory [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
10156 'Recursion theory' concerns what can be solved by computing machines [Feferman/Feferman]
10155 Both Principia Mathematica and Peano Arithmetic are undecidable [Feferman/Feferman]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
5662 Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
5664 Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
5668 People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5661 We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
5665 Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer]
5666 Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 6. Body sustains Self
5669 Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
10435 A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury]
10451 Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan]
5813 A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
5815 Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan]