79 ideas
| 11006 | Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell] |
| 11159 | My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K] |
| 11157 | Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K] |
| 11171 | Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K] |
| 10147 | The Axiom of Choice is consistent with the other axioms of set theory [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10148 | Axiom of Choice: a set exists which chooses just one element each of any set of sets [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10149 | Platonist will accept the Axiom of Choice, but others want criteria of selection or definition [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10150 | The Trichotomy Principle is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10146 | Cantor's theories needed the Axiom of Choice, but it has led to great controversy [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
| 18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
| 18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
| 10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
| 15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
| 2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
| 7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
| 10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
| 1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
| 7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
| 6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
| 6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
| 7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
| 7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| 12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
| 4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| 11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
| 21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
| 12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
| 7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
| 11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
| 6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
| 10158 | A structure is a 'model' when the axioms are true. So which of the structures are models? [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10162 | Tarski and Vaught established the equivalence relations between first-order structures [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10160 | Löwenheim-Skolem says if the sentences are countable, so is the model [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10159 | Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, and Gödel's completeness of first-order logic, the earliest model theory [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10161 | If a sentence holds in every model of a theory, then it is logically derivable from the theory [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10156 | 'Recursion theory' concerns what can be solved by computing machines [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10155 | Both Principia Mathematica and Peano Arithmetic are undecidable [Feferman/Feferman] |
| 11151 | An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K] |
| 18775 | Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 7533 | The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk] |
| 6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
| 18777 | If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell] |
| 11152 | Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K] |
| 11161 | Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K] |
| 11160 | Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K] |
| 11158 | Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K] |
| 11167 | Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 16537 | Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe] |
| 11163 | The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 11164 | It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K] |
| 10935 | An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami] |
| 10936 | Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami] |
| 11165 | If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K] |
| 11166 | The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K] |
| 11169 | Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K] |
| 11162 | Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K] |
| 11168 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K] |
| 4567 | Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| 5810 | Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell] |
| 16385 | A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati] |
| 5774 | Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell] |
| 5775 | In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell] |
| 16987 | By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke] |
| 4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
| 16349 | Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati] |
| 7313 | 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| 7767 | The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 11170 | Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K] |
| 11172 | The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K] |
| 5773 | The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell] |