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All the ideas for 'Alfred Tarski: life and logic', 'Essence and Modality' and 'Brains and Behaviour'

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34 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
11159 My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
11157 Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
11171 Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
10147 The Axiom of Choice is consistent with the other axioms of set theory [Feferman/Feferman]
10148 Axiom of Choice: a set exists which chooses just one element each of any set of sets [Feferman/Feferman]
10149 Platonist will accept the Axiom of Choice, but others want criteria of selection or definition [Feferman/Feferman]
10150 The Trichotomy Principle is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice [Feferman/Feferman]
10146 Cantor's theories needed the Axiom of Choice, but it has led to great controversy [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10158 A structure is a 'model' when the axioms are true. So which of the structures are models? [Feferman/Feferman]
10162 Tarski and Vaught established the equivalence relations between first-order structures [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
10160 Löwenheim-Skolem says if the sentences are countable, so is the model [Feferman/Feferman]
10159 Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, and Gödel's completeness of first-order logic, the earliest model theory [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
10161 If a sentence holds in every model of a theory, then it is logically derivable from the theory [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
10156 'Recursion theory' concerns what can be solved by computing machines [Feferman/Feferman]
10155 Both Principia Mathematica and Peano Arithmetic are undecidable [Feferman/Feferman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
11151 An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
11152 Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
11161 Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
11160 Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K]
11158 Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11167 Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
16537 Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
11163 The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
11164 It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
10935 An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
10936 Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11165 If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
11166 The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
11169 Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
11162 Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
11168 Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
3460 Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Putnam, by Searle]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
11170 Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K]
11172 The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K]