Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Value Theory', 'Symbolic Reasoning' and 'The Ways of Paradox'

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22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
21548 The null class is the class with all the non-existents as its members [MacColl, by Lackey]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
21695 The set scheme discredited by paradoxes is actually the most natural one [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
21693 Russell's antinomy challenged the idea that any condition can produce a set [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
21691 Antinomies contradict accepted ways of reasoning, and demand revisions [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
21690 Whenever the pursuer reaches the spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved on [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
21689 A barber shaves only those who do not shave themselves. So does he shave himself? [Quine]
21694 Membership conditions which involve membership and non-membership are paradoxical [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
21692 If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]