94 ideas
12124 | Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon] |
12123 | Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon] |
12119 | Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon] |
12120 | Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon] |
13395 | If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien] |
24047 | An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle] |
24052 | From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle] |
13378 | It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien] |
13402 | We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien] |
13405 | The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien] |
13399 | Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien] |
13398 | We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien] |
13392 | Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien] |
1729 | We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle] |
13404 | To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien] |
24057 | What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle] |
13386 | If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien] |
13403 | The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien] |
16752 | Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle] |
13375 | The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien] |
13393 | Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien] |
13388 | It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien] |
13384 | Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien] |
13385 | Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien] |
24058 | The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle] |
13383 | If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien] |
13400 | If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien] |
13401 | The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien] |
24055 | Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle] |
24040 | Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle] |
13380 | Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien] |
13376 | We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien] |
13381 | Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien] |
13382 | Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien] |
13379 | If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien] |
13394 | Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien] |
13391 | Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien] |
13374 | To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien] |
13389 | The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien] |
13390 | Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien] |
5051 | The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle] |
16723 | Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle] |
1724 | Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle] |
1730 | Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle] |
17711 | Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares] |
1725 | Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle] |
1732 | Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle] |
1728 | Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle] |
1727 | Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle] |
1734 | In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle] |
1726 | We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle] |
12121 | We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon] |
16647 | Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle] |
24048 | Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle] |
12117 | Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon] |
12127 | Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon] |
16646 | To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle] |
1714 | Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle] |
5507 | Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi] |
24051 | Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle] |
12086 | Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle] |
16754 | The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle] |
24046 | Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle] |
1717 | If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle] |
24053 | If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle] |
1721 | What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle] |
1735 | In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle] |
24061 | If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle] |
24062 | Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle] |
12126 | People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon] |
1710 | Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle] |
24056 | The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle] |
24039 | All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle] |
24050 | If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle] |
24049 | Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle] |
1514 | Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle] |
2683 | Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
1718 | Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle] |
13275 | The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle] |
13396 | Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien] |
1733 | Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle] |
23307 | Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
13377 | First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien] |
24060 | Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle] |
4376 | Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle] |
1740 | Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle] |
12125 | Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon] |
12118 | Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon] |
24045 | Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle] |
1738 | Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle] |
24044 | Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle] |
1739 | If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle] |
24064 | If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle] |
24063 | What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle] |