108 ideas
| 12124 | Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon] |
| 11912 | Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar] |
| 12123 | Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon] |
| 12119 | Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon] |
| 12120 | Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon] |
| 3807 | Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions [Hume] |
| 11920 | A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar] |
| 8649 | Two numbers are equal if all of their units correspond to one another [Hume] |
| 21291 | There is no medium state between existence and non-existence [Hume] |
| 11919 | Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar] |
| 11929 | The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar] |
| 11927 | Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar] |
| 11915 | If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar] |
| 11916 | 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar] |
| 11956 | 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar] |
| 11928 | Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar] |
| 11942 | Power is the possibility of action, as discovered by experience [Hume] |
| 11949 | There may well be powers in things, with which we are quite unacquainted [Hume] |
| 11933 | A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar] |
| 11932 | Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar] |
| 11934 | The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar] |
| 11947 | Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar] |
| 11953 | Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar] |
| 11952 | The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar] |
| 11943 | Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar] |
| 11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
| 11950 | We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them [Hume] |
| 11941 | The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous [Hume] |
| 11914 | Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar] |
| 11913 | For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar] |
| 11962 | Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar] |
| 11098 | Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance [Hume, by Quine] |
| 7954 | If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences [Hume] |
| 21293 | Individuation is only seeing that a thing is stable and continuous over time [Hume] |
| 12048 | The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume] |
| 13424 | Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume] |
| 11917 | Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar] |
| 11955 | There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar] |
| 11918 | The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar] |
| 21299 | Changing a part can change the whole, not absolutely, but by its proportion of the whole [Hume] |
| 21300 | A change more obviously destroys an identity if it is quick and observed [Hume] |
| 1321 | If identity survives change or interruption, then resemblance, contiguity or causation must unite the parts of it [Hume] |
| 1330 | If a republic can retain identity through many changes, so can an individual [Hume] |
| 21302 | If a ruined church is rebuilt, its relation to its parish makes it the same church [Hume] |
| 21303 | We accept the identity of a river through change, because it is the river's nature [Hume] |
| 21301 | The purpose of the ship makes it the same one through all variations [Hume] |
| 1207 | Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity [Hume] |
| 21290 | Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different [Hume] |
| 21289 | 'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity [Hume] |
| 21292 | Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time [Hume] |
| 9428 | Nothing we clearly imagine is absolutely impossible [Hume] |
| 4766 | Necessity only exists in the mind, and not in objects [Hume] |
| 11963 | What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar] |
| 6526 | Hume says objects are not a construction, but an imaginative leap [Hume, by Robinson,H] |
| 12121 | We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon] |
| 6489 | Associationism results from having to explain intentionality just with sense-data [Robinson,H on Hume] |
| 6182 | Even Hume didn't include mathematics in his empiricism [Hume, by Kant] |
| 12417 | Mathematicians only accept their own proofs when everyone confims them [Hume] |
| 5548 | Hume became a total sceptic, because he believed that reason was a deception [Hume, by Kant] |
| 12117 | Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon] |
| 12127 | Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon] |
| 7446 | The idea of inductive evidence, around 1660, made Hume's problem possible [Hume, by Hacking] |
| 11951 | Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar] |
| 11936 | The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar] |
| 11935 | Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar] |
| 21806 | Memory, senses and understanding are all founded on the imagination [Hume] |
| 12126 | People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon] |
| 3819 | Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume] |
| 1317 | A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume] |
| 1331 | The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume] |
| 1388 | Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume] |
| 21297 | A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume] |
| 1316 | Introspection always discovers perceptions, and never a Self without perceptions [Hume] |
| 1333 | Memory only reveals personal identity, by showing cause and effect [Hume] |
| 1332 | We use memory to infer personal actions we have since forgotten [Hume] |
| 21305 | Memory not only reveals identity, but creates it, by producing resemblances [Hume] |
| 21307 | Who thinks that because you have forgotten an incident you are no longer that person? [Hume] |
| 21306 | Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other [Hume] |
| 21294 | A continuous lifelong self must be justified by a single sustained impression, which we don't have [Hume] |
| 21295 | When I introspect I can only observe my perceptions, and never a self which has them [Hume] |
| 21298 | We pretend our perceptions are continuous, and imagine a self to fill the gaps [Hume] |
| 21304 | Identity in the mind is a fiction, like that fiction that plants and animals stay the same [Hume] |
| 11944 | Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar] |
| 20030 | If one event causes another, the two events must be wholly distinct [Hume, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 6692 | For Hume, practical reason has little force, because we can always modify our desires [Hume, by Graham] |
| 8257 | Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will [Hume] |
| 22374 | You can only hold people responsible for actions which arise out of their character [Hume] |
| 22382 | We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings [Hume] |
| 4008 | Modern science has destroyed the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and morality [Hume, by Taylor,C] |
| 8067 | The problem of getting to 'ought' from 'is' would also apply in getting to 'owes' or 'needs' [Anscombe on Hume] |
| 4578 | You can't move from 'is' to 'ought' without giving some explanation or reason for the deduction [Hume] |
| 3650 | Total selfishness is not irrational [Hume] |
| 12125 | Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon] |
| 14301 | We have no good concept of solidity or matter, because accounts of them are all circular [Hume] |
| 11960 | Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar] |
| 11937 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar] |
| 11954 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar] |
| 8382 | For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation [Hume, by Crane] |
| 11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
| 19274 | Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events [Kripke on Hume] |
| 12118 | Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon] |
| 11959 | Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar] |
| 9448 | Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford] |
| 11930 | One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar] |
| 11957 | It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar] |
| 11921 | The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar] |
| 11931 | Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar] |
| 21296 | If all of my perceptions were removed by death, nothing more is needed for total annihilation [Hume] |